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Meaningful Measures of the Current Account 
Eric O’N. Fisher and YoungSoo Woo* 
Abstract 
Since the conventional current account uses cash-ﬂow accounting, it is potentially devoid of economic 
meaning. Assessing foreign assets at market values and including expected transfers from abroad, this paper 
reports two measures of the external surplus that are grounded in economic theory. The ﬁrst measure is the 
aggregate generational current account, annual differences in the sum of net foreign assets across all current 
and future generations. The second measure is the generational proﬁle of net foreign assets in a benchmark 
year. These ideas are implemented with data from Korea. 
1. Introduction 
By now it is well known that the conventional government deﬁcit is ﬂawed. There are 
two major criticisms. First, Eisner (1989) emphasizes that it does not account for 
changes in the value of the stocks of central government assets and liabilities. Second, 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and Auerbach et al. (1994) argue convincingly that 
changes in the conventional measure of the government deﬁcit are not related in any 
meaningful way to changes in agents’ utilities. Fisher (1995) showed that their logic 
carries over to the open economy. 
Why do we economists compile and analyze macroeconomic statistics? Any 
thoughtful answer will eventually appeal to a notion of human welfare. Economic 
statistics, however, are typically compiled in calendar time, and they may not be 
measured in a way that relates them directly to the agents in an economy. Since capital 
markets allow agents to smooth consumption, anticipated future transfers may affect 
agents as much as current payments. Kotlikoff (1993) emphasizes that the real effects 
of such transfers ought to be part of any proper measure of the government deﬁcit, and 
he argues that changes in government policy can only be understood within the 
framework of generational accounts.1 
The current account includes transfers too. Thus all the criticisms leveled against 
conventional government deﬁcit are also true for it. Unilateral transfers are not a small 
part of the external account; net military transfers and net unilateral transfers have 
accounted for about 15% of the US current account deﬁcit in the last decade.2 Since 
international capital markets also allow agents to borrow in anticipation of future 
receipts, there is no simple relationship between current transfers and the utility of 
domestic and foreign agents. 
Using this simple observation, Fisher (1995) showed that the conventional current 
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account is not well deﬁned. In particular, for any description of countries’ unilateral 
transfers, there is an implementation of these transfers such that any country’s conven­
tional current account satisﬁes any exogenous constraint. The intuition is that a coun­
try can always delay unilateral transfers to abroad and make its conventional current 
account surplus as large as necessary. Since agents can borrow against anticipated 
future transfers, delaying a transfer will not affect an agent’s consumption choices if 
future receipts maintain his real income in every state of the world. But then the real 
effects of international economic policy are fully reﬂected only by expected transfers 
from abroad. 
This argument is true for the government deﬁcit as well. Since Auerbach et al. (1991) 
are interested in how government deﬁcits transfer resources between generations and 
between agents in the same generation, they construct measures for representative 
males and females in different cohorts. Of course, external deﬁcits matter for a differ­
ent reason. The international economist studies how ﬁscal policy affects aggregate 
trade ﬂows between countries. 
Thus our ﬁrst measure, called the aggregate generational current account, keeps track 
of the sum of expected net transfers to abroad, and it does not take explicit 
intergenerational transfers into account. Hence, this measure is easier to construct than 
Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff’s generational accounts because it is not designed 
to keep track of transfers between males and females or between those alive and those 
not yet born. If countries can tax only their own citizens, then a worsening of the 
aggregate generational current account indicates that some domestic agent (alive or 
not yet born) will suffer decreased utility. 
Our second measure, called the generational proﬁle of net foreign assets, keeps track 
of private and public assets and allows for generational heterogeneity. Since different 
generations have different patterns of historical asset accumulation, changes in inter­
national economic conditions will affect cohorts disparately. The value of a genera­
tion’s private assets is the market value of its own net international investment 
position, but we assume that public assets are shared between current and future 
generations. For example, the stock of central bank reserves generates a ﬂow of 
income that is divided equally among current and future domestic residents. The stock 
of economic and military aid likewise generates a ﬂow of income for all generations 
alive during the course of these expected transfers. 
What are the properties of an ideal measure of the external surplus? A good 
measure ought to reﬂect accurately the change in the real value of net foreign assets. 
It should possess four properties. First, it should be invariant with respect to propor­
tional changes in all the prices in the world economy. Second, it ought to be related 
transparently to agents’ utilities. Third, it should incorporate foreseeable changes in 
net foreign assets. Fourth, it ought to be independent of transfers among the agents in 
the domestic economy. 
Constructing any ideal measure is a part of the theory of index numbers, and dealing 
in depth with issues of aggregation and proper price indices is beyond the scope of our 
work. Still, the conventional current account surplus is reported in current prices, and 
it is thus not very informative in an inﬂationary environment. Fisher’s (1995) aggregate 
generational current account deﬂates the stock of net foreign assets by nominal interest 
rates that include both a real discount factor and a realized inﬂation rate, and thus it 
deals in part with the effects of inﬂation. 
Any measure of the external surplus that is related to the well-being of domestic 
residents must take into account changes in the market values of foreign assets. Both 
of our measures do so, and an increase in the aggregate generational current account 
  
        
    
   
    
 
    
  
   
  
  
   
  
 
  
shows that some domestic resident has higher wealth abroad. Moreover, the 
generational proﬁle of net foreign assets shows exactly which domestic cohort has 
higher foreign wealth. 
Since our measures also incorporate an estimate of the present value of expected 
public transfers from abroad, they actually include foreseeable changes in the value of 
net foreign assets. Finally, our measures are independent of transfers among domestic 
residents. Only if these transfers change the conventional trade surplus will they appear 
in either measure. Thus our standards have several of the properties of an ideal measure. 
In the next section we describe our two measures from a theoretical perspective, and 
then we implement them in the third section with data from Korea. That country serves 
as a good example for two reasons. First, the Korean economy is one of the most 
rapidly growing economies in the world. Hence, it is interesting to examine the extent 
to which constraints on the external account have hampered Korea’s growth. Second, 
the Korean economy has received unilateral aid transfers for a considerable time. 
Indeed, the existence of foreign aid institutions and programs over a long period, 
especially during and after the Korean war, enables us to predict aid ﬂows and to 
calculate the expected time of their duration, taking economic, social and political 
considerations into account. 
2. A Simple Economy 
Consider a world economy with uncertainty, and with a slight abuse of notation let 
S = {0,1, . . .  ,  S} be the set of states of nature. We will identify the initial element of S 
with the current period, and its other elements are an exhaustive description of an 
uncertain future. For simplicity we will analyze an exchange economy, but it will 
become apparent that the force of our arguments still applies to an economy with 
production. Let the index set of consumers be I = D ∪ F, with D ∩ F = ∅; then i ∈ D 
is a domestic resident and i ∈ F is a foreigner. In each s ∈ S there are L physical 
commodities. Finally, the agents trade K assets in state 0. Following Radner (1982), we 
shall assume that an asset is a title to receive rsk units of good 1 in state s ∈ S − {0}. The 
price of asset k is qk. Radner’s framework allows for a simple description of a wide class 
of economies, even those with incomplete asset markets. 
i i iAs usual, xs = (xs1, . .  . ,  xsL) and ωs
i 
= (ω s
i 
1, . . .  ,  ω
i 
sL) denote the demands and endow­
ments respectively of consumer i in state s. Then agent i’s consumption set is Xi ⊂ 
i i iUL(S + 1), and her consumption plan is x = (x0, . . .  ,  xS) ∈ X
i. An agent’s preferences are 
summarized by a utility function Ui:  Xi → U.3 Likewise, an agent’s portfolio plan is 
i i iz = (z1, .  . . ,  zK) ∈ U
K, where we are explicitly allowing unlimited short sales. Now let 
ps = (ps1, . . .  , psL) ∈U+ 
L be the vector of spot prices for the L commodities in state s, and 
q = (q1, . . .  , qK) ∈ U+ 
K be that of asset prices in state 0. 
We shall assume that the domestic government levies lump-sum taxes and transfers 
on all the agents in the world economy. These taxes are state-contingent, and those that 
accrue to agent i in state s are denoted by τ s
i . If τ is < 0 for some i ∈ F, then a foreigner 
receives transfers from the domestic government. The government ﬁnances its ﬁscal 
policy with the portfolio zg ∈ UK . 
An equilibrium is a list of prices p =  {ps}s∈S and q and corresponding consumption 
plans x* = {x*i}i∈I and portfolio plans z* = {z*
i}i∈I such that: 
i i i K i i(i) x ∗ ∈X and z ∗ ∈ℜ maximizes U x( )  
subject to 
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
 
  
i i i i(a) p x + ⋅ ≤ p and⋅ q z  ⋅ω − τ0 0 k 0 0 0 
i i i i(b) p x ≤ p ⋅ω − τ + p z r  for s S  0s ⋅ s s k s ∑ s1 k sk ∈  − { }; 
k 
g	 i i g(ii) q z ≤ τ and 0 ≤ τ + p z r  for s S  − { };⋅ ∑ 0 ∑ s ∑ s1 k sk ∈ 0 
i i k 
(iii)	 ∑z ∗i + zg ≤ 0 and
 
i
 
i	 i(iv) ∑ x∗ ≤ ∑ω . 
i i 
This deﬁnition requires materials balances in each state of nature, and it states that no 
asset is in positive net supply in the initial period of the economy. It also requires that 
the government’s budget be balanced in every state of nature. Further, it allows agents 
to trade assets and thus transfer purchasing power across states of nature, but it does 
not assume that asset markets are complete. 
Now let prices (p, q) and the corresponding plans (x*, z*) be an equilibrium. Then 
the conventional current account at time 0 is: 
i i ip0 ⋅∑(ω0 − x0 ∗ ) +∑τ 0 .	 (1) 
i D∈ i F∈ 
Equation (1) states that the conventional external surplus is the sum of the trade 
balance and net unilateral transfers. 
Consider a tax in the amount τ 0 
i 
= q1 levied by the domestic government on some i ∈ 
F. Assume further that this tax is fully offset by a corresponding subsidy of τ s
i 
= −rs1ps1 
in each state in the next period. This tax increases the conventional current account 
surplus at time 0; in essence, it is an exogenous increase in the excess demand for 
foreign assets. Of course, the offsetting future transfer increases the current account 
deﬁcit in the next period by the amount ps1rk1. But the scheme of taxes and transfers is 
chosen so that it leaves goods and asset prices and each agent’s equilibrium allocations 
unchanged. Also, as long as rsl ≥ 0 and agent i’s marginal utility of income is well-
deﬁned in each state, we can choose prices so that 
q = p r  µ i ,∑ s s  s1 1 1 
  
s S  0
∈ −{ }  
where µi is the shadow value associated with consumer i’s budget constraint in state s.s
Thus the rescheduling of transfers satisﬁes the government’s budget constraint. 
How should one interpret the rescheduling of these unilateral transfers to abroad? If 
the domestic country has a ﬁat asset that is valued in every state of nature, then the 
government improves the conventional current account simply by delaying payments 
to abroad and promising foreigners repayment of principal and interest in the next 
period. If domestic economy has no such asset, then the timing of transfers is a 
rescheduling of sovereign debt that leaves the present value of debt service unchanged 
in every state of the world. This “infusion of foreign ofﬁcial capital” leaves the present 
value of the equity of any international creditor unchanged, but it allows the conven­
tional current account of the debtor country to be anything. 
None of our arguments depends upon the number of goods, countries, or assets 
available in the world economy. Also, it is clear that these ideas are still true in an 
economy with production, as long as ﬁrms’ investment decisions are described care­
fully in an environment of incomplete markets. Thus we have established that the 
  
   
  
  
  
conventional current account in all but the ﬁnal period is arbitrary, and the natural 
generalization to an economy with inﬁnitely many periods is also true: the conventional 
current account is not well deﬁned at any time! The force and generality of the argument 
stems from the fact that conventional macroeconomic statistics are often only cash-
ﬂow accounting conventions that may have very little to do with economic well-being. 
What are meaningful measures of a country’s external surplus? In this paper, we 
propose two measures. The ﬁrst is annual changes in the stock 
⎜ ⎟ +∑ ∑ ( ) i (2)q ⋅ ⎛∑z ∗i + zg ⎞ π s 0 τ s , 
i D∈ i F∈ s S  0⎝ ⎠ ∈ −{ }  
where π(s|0) is the conditional probability that state s ∈ S − {0} occurs. This measure is 
the aggregate generational current account, and it incorporates changes in both the 
market value of a country’s net international investment position and in expected 
unilateral transfers from abroad.4 
The second measure captures the full generational heterogeneity inherent in an 
actual economy. Consider a partition of the index set D into D1 ∪ . . .  ∪ Dn; one can 
now deﬁne the stocks 
−1⎛ ⎞ i gb 0 q ∗ + # D ) ⋅ + π s 0 τ i ⎟ for j ∈ 1, . . . ,  n .j( ) = ⋅ ∑z ( j ⎜⎜q z  ∑ ∑ ( ) s ⎟ { }
i Dj ⎝ i F∈ s S { }∈ ∈ − 0 ⎠ 
If this partition corresponds to age cohorts, then the list 
{ }b 0 (3)j( ) n 
j=1 
is the full generational proﬁle of net foreign assets given the information set in state 0. 
We have assumed that expected transfers from abroad are shared equally by agents in 
each generation, perhaps even by those not yet born, but the ownership of private net 
foreign assets is determined by individual investment decisions. 
Consider a change in the exogenous variables or stochastic process describing expec­
tations such that (2) or some element of (3) increases. Such a change has at least three 
interpretations. First, there has been a capital gain in the value of net foreign assets. 
Second, real interest rates have changed. Third, the domestic currency has experienced 
a real depreciation. The crucial point is that each of these phenomena must affect the 
utility of some or all agents in the domestic economy, unlike changes in the conven­
tional current account. 
Here is the essence of the paradox. On the one hand, cash ﬂow accounts are 
measured quite precisely, but robust theoretical arguments show that they are poten­
tially devoid of economic meaning. On the other hand, generational accounts and our 
deﬁnitions of the external surplus are measured imprecisely, but they do have sound 
foundations in economic theory. So one is caught between Scylla and Charybdis. Is it 
more useful to accept an accurate measurement of a meaningless number or to attempt 
a rough measure of a useful economic concept? Recognizing the need for some heroic 
assumptions, we turn our attention to the latter endeavor. 
3. Implementing these Measures 
The actual derivation of the aggregate generational current account consists of two 
main parts: (1) computing the market value of a country’s net international investment 
position; and (2) calculating the present value of the net expected transfer payment 
from abroad. In essence, the aggregate generational current account treats expected 
transfers from abroad as assets and capitalizes them. Of course, such transfers have 
been a main source of ﬁnancing imports into Korea, but there has been a secular 
change in the composition of the source of ﬁnancing of international transactions. 
During the ﬁrst two decades after World War II, the main source of ﬁnancing imports 
was foreign aid intermediated by international institutions. However, after 1965, the 
United States of America became the primary contributor of the aid to Korea and 
committed implicitly to providing long-term loans as a means of continuing support.5 
Military aid has been closely related to the US military policy on the Korean 
peninsula since World War II. The major changes in this policy in general can be 
classiﬁed into four periods: (1) post-war relief from 1946 to 1948; (2) the Marshall Plan 
from 1949 to 1952; (3) the Mutual Security Act from 1953 to 1961; and (4) the Foreign 
Assistance Act from 1962 until now. The ﬂow of military aid increased continuously 
during and after the Korean War and reached its peak during the Vietnam War. Since 
1956, the value of military aid has exceeded that of economic aid. Although most of this 
aid was used for the build-up of Korea’s defense capability, it has been quite important 
in the development process. It has declined since 1971, following changes in the 
military policies of the United States of America.6 
Appendix 1 gives a detailed description of the data that we discuss in the next four 
subsections. It is important that the reader keep in mind that almost all of our data are 
assembled from information not reported directly in Korea’s balance of payments. For 
example, the data on private assets and liabilities held in won are derived from surveys 
of the domestic ﬁnancial sector, and the data on expected economic and military 
transfers come from idiosyncratic sources, not from the line in the balance of payments 
that reports unrequited transfers. The market value of foreign direct investment is 
calculated using country-speciﬁc stock market indices. As the reader shall see below, 
our measure of the aggregate generational current account is highly correlated with the 
historical values of the conventional measure of the current account. This fact is 
reassuring, and it lends conﬁdence to our empirical analysis. 
The Net International Investment Position 
The ﬁrst big step is to calculate Korea’s net international investment position. We 
followed Ulan and Dewald’s (1989) technique of evaluating foreign assets at market 
value. Calculating Korea’s net international investment position is accomplished in 
three steps. First, we used the table in the Bank of Korea’s Economic Statistics 
Yearbook reporting the assets of the central bank to determine the annual stocks of 
ofﬁcial reserve assets. We did not exclude the value of gold holdings because they 
were indeed an international asset for Korea, especially under the Bretton Woods 
System. 
Second, we determined Korea’s private foreign assets and private foreign liabilities 
from the two tables in the Economic Statistics Yearbook entitled “Monetary Survey” 
and “Foreign Exchange Assets and Liabilities (Summary).” The former reports private 
assets and liabilities that are intermediated by the Korean banking system, and the 
latter reports private assets and liabilities that are held in foreign currencies. The ﬁrst 
table reports the ﬂow of funds for the domestic ﬁnancial sector in won, and the second 
table reports the dollar values of Korea’s assets and liabilities denominated in foreign 
currencies. We used end-of-year market exchange rates as reported by the Interna­
  
  
tional Monetary Fund in International Financial Statistics to convert the domestic ﬂow­
of-funds data from won into current dollars. 
Third, we used the balance-of-payments data on long-term capital transactions from 
Economic Statistics Yearbook to determine the annual ﬂows of both foreign direct 
investment into Korea and Korean foreign direct investment abroad. Again following 
Ulan and Dewald, we used stock market indices reported by the IMF in International 
Financial Statistics to convert these ﬂows into stocks of the market values of both 
inward and outward foreign direct investment.7 The data on outward direct foreign 
investment are reported by region in Economic Statistics Yearbook. These data are 
broken down into the following areas: Southeast Asia, Mid-Asia, North America, 
Latin America, Europe, Africa, and Oceania. We used stock market indices for Aus­
tralia, the United States of America, Japan, and Germany to determine the market 
value of Korean outward foreign direct investment and GDP deﬂators to determine 
the market value of Korean investment in Saudi Arabia, Liberia, and Panama.8 The 
book value of Korean inward foreign direct investment was marked to market using an 
exchange rate index and the Korean stock market index reported in Economic Statis­
tics Yearbook. Summing the calculations from these three steps gives Korea’s net 
international investment position, taking public and private assets into account. 
The Capitalized Value of Expected Unilateral Transfers 
The second step entails capitalizing expected net transfers from abroad. We analyzed 
two kinds of unilateral transfers: military aid and economic aid. The data on economic 
aid come primarily from the Bank of Korea’s Economic Statistics Yearbook, and those 
on military aid are derived from Hwang et al. (1990). Because much of the information 
related to the military policy is classiﬁed, we may not have captured all military 
transfers into Korea. Still, we have included a large part of expected unilateral military 
transfers. 
We assumed throughout that Korea had no long-term commitments to pay unilateral 
transfers to any other country. Hence, we are capitalizing only an expected inﬂow of 
military and economic transfers from abroad. Also, our calculations for military aid 
assume that such aid is provided entirely by the United States of America. 
We did not simply capitalize transfers from abroad by assuming that they would 
continue into perpetuity. Instead, we determined the expected durations for the two 
kinds of unilateral payments for the different periods of post-war Korean history. 
Because it is an expected unilateral transfer payment, the duration of aid ﬂow should be 
based on the social, political and economic situations involved around the announce­
ment of the aid program. We classify the expected duration of the aid ﬂow into ﬁve 
categories, with durations of 1 year, 5 years, 10 years, 15 years, and perpetuity. Once we 
have postulated the duration of an aid ﬂow, we capitalize its value using market 
(dollar) interest rates during the years of its duration. Hence, a grant of $1 million with 
an expected duration of ﬁve years has a capitalized value of ∑st =+ t 4(tδs) millions, where 
δs = ∏ js =t+1(1 +  ij)−1 is the market discount factor from period t to s, 1 + ij is the gross 
nominal interest rate from period j to j + 1, and tδt = 1. The art of constructing expected 
unilateral transfers consists in positing the duration of transfers from abroad, and we 
used the accounts of Korean economic development in Kim (1970) and Kwon 
(1990) to form our judgments about the expected duration of economic aid ﬂows. 
We make explicit our assumptions about the duration of both kinds of aid ﬂows in 
Appendix 2. 
t
Changes in Net Foreign Assets Broadly Deﬁned 
The penultimate step in computing the aggregate generational current account is to 
add the capitalized value of expected unilateral transfers to the net international 
investment position. Then one takes ﬁrst differences to arrive at the ﬁnal numbers. 
Table 1 presents our computations for these historical data. 
Figure 1 presents historical data contrasting the aggregate generational current 
account with the conventional current account. Notice that the aggregate generational 
current account showed several large surpluses during the 1950s. This fact reﬂects the 
large capitalized value of aid ﬂows that occurred during and after the Korean War. 
Also, the sharp deterioration of the aggregate generational current account in 1961 
reﬂects the reduction in expected transfers from abroad owing to worsening diplomatic 
relations with the United States of America in the wake of the military coup of that 
year. Since expected aid ﬂows were largely curtailed by the last decade, the sharp 
surpluses in the late 1980s reﬂects the rise in the dollar value of Korean assets, owing 
to the rapid appreciation of the yen and other currencies against the dollar in those 
years. The aggregate generational current account shows generally smaller deﬁcits 
than the conventional current account in most of these years because expected trans­
fers from abroad have been an important element of the external balance for Korea. 
The two measures of the current account are highly correlated, although the aggre­
gate general current account is more volatile than the conventional current account, 
just as the price of a common stock is more volatile than its underlying stream of 
dividends. The mean value of the aggregate generation current account is higher than 
that of the conventional current account during this period, but, using the Procrustean 
assumptions of normality and independence of the two processes, one cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that the two measures are drawn from distributions with the same ﬁrst 
moments. Finally, the aggregate generational current account is more frequently in 
Figure 1. Korea’s Aggregate Generational Current Account (billions of dollars) 
Table 1. Components of the Aggregate Generational Current Account (thousands of dollars)
 
Market value Aggregate 
Public and of net foreign generational 
private net direct Capitalized Capitalized current 
Year foreign assets investment economic aid military aid account 
1950 27,087 0 1,161,034 91,398 NA 
1951 39,192 0 2,051,962 113,298 924,007 
1952 85,364 0 3,024,723 31,609 939,462 
1953 130,142 0 3,546,959 68,155 602,142 
1954 130,133 0 2,724,846 62,775 −827,554 
1955 119,476 0 4,064,281 757,369 1,992,804 
1956 149,572 0 4,895,313 7,654,434 7,423,584 
1957 182,565 0 3,849,911 6,315,190 −2,317,028 
1958 245,082 0 3,081,516 1,369,697 −5,397,473 
1959 248,250 0 2,356,504 2,746,356 560,382 
1960 128,208 0 2,494,729 4,614,654 1,741,482 
1961 367,968 0 713,906 1,013,108 −4,824,043 
1962 280,594 0 761,137 1,705,627 652,377 
1963 205,522 −4,800 966,325 1,397,149 −183,161 
1964 207,690 −3,860 704,030 1,258,714 −397,622 
1965 223,355 −9,145 564,156 1,126,607 −261,600 
1966 436,144 −22,828 505,827 1,994,633 1,008,803 
1967 944,909 −50,935 233,672 2,620,900 834,770 
1968 1,092,124 −74,173 220,081 3,529,528 1,019,013 
1969 1,455,497 −97,575 142,984 3,255,374 −11,280 
1970 1,579,691 −161,444 92,749 2,391,696 −853,588 
1971 1,239,768 −221,034 77,304 3,882,987 1,076,334 
1972 1,480,493 −169,948 22,192 3,450,075 −196,213 
1973 2,671,079 −369,820 9,304 2,139,591 −332,658 
1974 617,540 −395,840 4,249 624,881 −3,599,326 
1975 1,982,184 −584,916 4,991 543,159 1,094,589 
1976 5,093,013 −682,662 7,444 410,312 2,882,690 
1977 9,254,919 −899,660 3,968 17,228 3,548,347 
1978 10,093,466 −1,593,258 169 10,251 134,174 
1979 9,428,043 −852,243 224 80,718 146,114 
1980 8,199,895 −494,223 361 786,080 −164,630 
1981 4,021,354 −612,037 236 100,855 −4,981,704 
1982 −878,817 −508,577 61 131,619 −4,766,121 
1983 −5,960,666 −295,166 30 1,619 −4,998,470 
1984 −4,979,512 −412,801 0 1,766 863,637 
1985 −9,319,275 −352,944 0 1,955 −4,279,717 
1986 −4,736,841 −1,041,461 0 1,816 3,893,778 
1987 12,551,677 −3,310,140 0 2,003 15,020,025 
1988 44,083,689 −10,043,641 0 1,652 24,798,160 
1989 55,790,314 −11,087,326 0 1,652 10,662,941 
1990 59,679,067 −6,745,809 0 1,652 8,230,269 
  
surplus than the conventional current account, reﬂecting that the capitalized value of 
expected transfers from abroad has been signiﬁcant for Korea. 
The wide swings of the aggregate generational current account in the 1950s repre­
sent changes in the present value of expected military aid ﬂows. The large drop in 1961 
reﬂects the diplomatic uncertainties about receipts of foreign aid after the coup that 
brought Park Jeong Hee to power. As the present value of expected foreign aid has 
decreased, the aggregate generational current account follows the conventional meas­
ure quite closely. This fact conﬁrms the validity of our approach because almost none 
of our data are drawn from traditional balance-of-payments statistics. 
The Generational Proﬁle of Net Foreign Assets 
The aggregate generational current account provides the foundation for determin­
ing the generational proﬁle of net foreign assets. Breaking down the ownership of 
assets by population cohort entails two steps. First, we keep track of the ownership of 
private net foreign assets. Second, we describe an explicit rule for allocating the 
ownership of public assets that include capitalized economic and military aid and the 
interest income from the central bank’s stock of foreign exchange reserves. 
We deﬁne a cohort to be all domestic residents born during the ﬁve-year period 
centered around its reference year; thus the generation labeled 1911 consists of all 
residents born between 1909 and 1913, who have survived until our population bench­
mark in 1993. Using the United Nations’ estimates of the populations of each 
cohort, we assumed arbitrarily that 6% of each generation died in every quinqu­
ennium. For example, our oldest cohort was estimated to consist of 309 thousand souls 
in 1993, and we imposed that there were 309(1.06)6 thousand people in that generation 
in 1963. 
The National Statistical Ofﬁce’s Annual Report on the Family Income and Expendi­
ture Survey gives annual data on average household incomes and expenditures begin­
ning in 1963; these data are broken down by the age of household head in a manner 
that corresponds to our generations. Using the contemporaneous population esti­
mates, we imputed the share of national savings accruing to a cohort in each calendar 
year. Then we used these shares to allocate annual ﬂows of private net foreign assets. 
We updated these estimated shares using our population estimates and subsequent 
data from the Family Income and Expenditure Survey for each quinquennium between 
1968 and 1988. Since a household becomes economically active in these data when its 
head reaches 24 years of age, we were adding new generations every ﬁve years. Thus, 
by 1988, we are following 12 different economically active generations. Each has 
different vintages of net foreign assets, and thus every group is affected disparately by 
changes in the market value of private net foreign assets. 
Public net foreign assets consist of economic and military aid and the assets of 
the central bank. We assumed that these assets are allocated equally among the 
agents alive during the course of the projected aid ﬂows. Also, we assumed that 
the reserves of the central bank are a ﬁnancial buffer held to smooth ﬂuctuations in 
the future external balance, and thus we allocated an equal amount v of reserves per 
capita to all current and future domestic residents. Let V be the value of central 
bank reserves in the benchmark year; we allocated them according to the budget 
constraint 
∞ 
V =∑v N  0 (1 + g)t (1+ i)t , 
t = 0 
Table 2. The Generational Proﬁle of Net Foreign Assets (1990 dollars per capita)
 
Generation Base case Thirty percent Depreciation Zero population growth 
1911 45 123 69 
1916 81 151 105 
1921 88 155 112 
1926 4 98 28 
1931 −126 22 −102 
1936 151 468 175 
1941 131 441 154 
1946 308 585 332 
1951 460 742 484 
1956 644 865 667 
1961 630 799 654 
1966 582 682 605 
1971 112 112 136 
1976 112 112 136 
1981 112 112 136 
1986 112 112 136 
Later 112 112 136 
where N0 is the total population, g is the forecast population growth rate, and i is the 
nominal interest rate, all in 1990. We assumed that the population growth rate was 
1.5% per annum, near its historical average in the last two decades. 
Table 2 reports the results for the benchmark. Older generations were most active 
when Korea borrowed net foreign assets, and their generational proﬁles are smallest. 
Middle-aged residents have some positive net foreign assets because their peak savings 
years occurred when Korea began to increase outward investment. Also, younger 
residents and those not yet born have “accumulated” $112 in net foreign assets, the per 
capita annuity implicit in the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves in 1990. At 
the beginning of this decade, projected economic and military aid ﬂows were expected 
to last for only one year; thus the capitalized value of these ﬂows for the unborn was 
zero. 
Table 2 also explores two policy scenarios. The ﬁrst involves a 30% depreciation of 
the won; it is modeled as a capital loss in the value of private liabilities to foreigners 
owed by domestic residents. This depreciation is thus a real loss for foreigners, and the 
third column of Table 2 shows that it Pareto-dominates the benchmark for domestic 
residents. The second scenario is one of projected zero population growth. Now the 
same amount of reserves can be spread among fewer current and future residents. This 
situation represents again a Pareto improvement over the benchmark for the domestic 
residents.9 Note also that one cannot Pareto-rank the ﬁrst and second scenarios; agents 
who owe liabilities to foreigners prefer the depreciation, but generations who are not 
yet economically active prefer zero population growth since they are granted a larger 
share of the central bank’s reserves. 
4. Conclusion 
We have constructed the ﬁrst measures of an external deﬁcit that are fundamentally 
related to human welfare. A worsening of the conventional current account need not 
indicate that a domestic resident will experience decreased utility. But a deterioration 
of the aggregate generational current account indicates an expectation of precisely that 
fact. For example, the military coup in 1961 entailed that Korea experienced a real 
constraint on its external accounts because of the anticipation of curtailed aid inﬂows. 
Also, the aggregate generational current account shows that the conventionally meas­
ured Korean external deﬁcits of the 1960s and 1970s were not as profound as one might 
have thought. 
Our constructions are benchmarks. As we have emphasized, these measures have 
meaning only when compared with alternative economic and military policies. The 
current spate of research on generational accounts has led the US Ofﬁce of Manage­
ment and Budget recently to report the federal budget deﬁcit using both the conven­
tional measure and generational accounts. We hope our own work on a generational 
measure of the external deﬁcit will spur further empirical research into macroeconomic 
statistics based on economic fact, not accounting ﬁction. 
Appendix 1: Description of the Data 
The data on the net foreign assets of Korea were constructed from the Bank of Korea’s 
Economic Statistics Yearbook. Table 4 is entitled “Monetary Survey” and reports 
foreign assets and foreign liabilities denominated in won. We used the end-of-period 
market exchange rate from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial 
Statistics to convert these values into current dollars; we took into account the mon­
etary reform in the early 1960s that changed the currency from hwan into won. The 
data on foreign assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currencies are reported in 
Table 118 of the Bank of Korea’s Economic Statistics Yearbook; these data are already 
reported in dollars. The value of the assets of the central bank are also included in the 
net international investment position of Korea; these data include the value of 
the Bank of Korea’s gold stocks, and they are reported in dollars in Table 116 of 
the Economic Statistics Yearbook. 
Aggregate data on inward and outward foreign direct investment are reported in 
dollars in the balance of payments table under the category “long-term capital.” They 
are found in Table 106 of the Economic Statistics Yearbook. The data are reported in 
dollars and are disaggregated by host country for outward Korean foreign direct 
investment; they are found in Table 119 of the Economic Statistics Yearbook. We used 
disaggregated data on Southeast Asia, Oceania, Europe, North America, Latin 
America, Mid-Asia, and Africa for Korean outward foreign direct investment. The 
data were adjusted for changes in the market value of assets using stock market indices 
(or GDP deﬂators) and nominal exchange rates available in International Financial 
Statistics. We used data from Japan for Southeast Asian investment, those from the 
United States of America for North American investment, those from Germany for 
European investment, and those from Australia for investment in Oceania. We used 
the Saudi Arabian GDP deﬂator for Mid-Asian investment because Saudi Arabia has 
no stock market. We used GDP deﬂators from Liberia to construct direct investment 
in Africa and data on Panama to construct direct investment in Latin America for the 
same reason. Data on inward foreign direct investment were adjusted for changes in 
the Korean stock market using data from Economic Statistics Yearbook. 
Since all data are expressed in dollars, we used the long-term Treasury Bill rate in 
the United States of America, as reported in International Financial Statistics, for the 
present-value calculations. For the present-value calculations that extend beyond 1994, 
we assumed that nominal American interest rates are constant into the indeﬁnite 
future. The data on Korea’s conventional current account are from the balance-of­
payments tables in various issues of Economic Statistics Yearbook. 
The data on economic aid to Korea are reported in Table 152 in the Bank of Korea’s 
Economic Statistics Yearbook. They are reported in dollars, and we capitalized the 
values that are reported in the ﬁrst column of that table. In order to avoid double 
counting, we subtracted the value of current aid received in a given year because we 
assumed that shows up as foreign exchange assets in that year. The data on military aid 
came from the table on page 31 of Hwang et al. (1990). We summed the three columns 
labeled MAP (Military Assistance Program), MASF (Military Assistance Service 
Fund), and IMET (International Military Education and Training) for the subcategory 
covering aid accruing only to Korea. 
The data used to construct the savings rates for each cohort were drawn from the 
Republic of Korea’s National Statistical Ofﬁce’s Annual Report on the Family Income 
and Expenditure Survey. We used the difference between columns entitled “Income” 
and “Expenditures” to determine savings for a cohort. Estimates of the 1993 
populations of each cohort are reported in the United Nations’ Statistical Yearbook for 
Asia and the Paciﬁc for 1994. 
Appendix 2: The Expected Duration of Aid Flows 
Here are our assumptions about the duration of economic aid. For the years 1950 
through 1956 inclusive, we assumed that aid ﬂows were expected to last forever. For 
the years 1957 through 1960 inclusive, we assumed that aid economic aid ﬂows would 
last for 15 years. We made these assumptions because until 1958, economic aid in­
creased steadily except during the Korean War and trade, aid and exchange rate 
policies exhibited a high degree of continuity (Krueger, 1979, p. 41). Also, economic 
aid was a main source of import ﬁnancing, and the share of aid in GNP rose from 
roughly 7% in 1953 to 14% in 1957. Several institutions gave continuous unilateral 
transfers during these years. These included GARIOA (Government Appropriations 
for Relief in Occupied Areas), the Economic Cooperation Administration, UNKRA 
(United Nations Korea Reconstruction Agency), and CRIK (Civil Relief in Korea). 
Still, foreign economic aid started to decrease in the late 1950s, and that is why we 
assumed that its expected duration was only 15 years during the latter part of the 
decade. 
We assumed that economic aid had an expected duration of only ﬁve years during 
1961 and 1962. The absolute amount of aid ﬂow started to fall in the late 1950s, and 
diplomatic relations between the United States of America and Korea deteriorated 
after the coup d’état in 1961. For the years from 1963 through 1966 inclusive, we 
assumed that the expected duration of aid was 10 years. The relationship between 
donor and recipient was predicated on the assumption that aid would continue to be 
phased out. This factor was crucial leading to the decision to embark upon an export-
promotion strategy (Krueger, p. 112). Also, the absolute and relative importance of aid 
decreased, and by 1965, aid ﬁnanced less than one-third of ﬂow of imports. Finally, 
Korea’s export orientation succeeded in attracting foreign capital, so aid was no longer 
perceived as enduring. 
We assumed that economic aid during the period from 1967 through 1977 inclusive 
would have a duration of ﬁve years. The ﬂow of economic aid kept decreasing through­
out this period, and the United States was no longer the sole provider of aid. Most of 
its aid switched from grants to loans. Also, the Korean economy experienced dramatic 
 growth owing to the success of its ﬁve-year plans. Finally, we assumed that the duration 
of economic aid was one year for the period from 1978 to the present. 
Here are our assumptions about the duration of military aid. For the period from 
1950 through 1960 inclusive, we assumed that military aid would last forever. This 
assumption follows from the facts that the Korean War broke out in 1950, the United 
States of America and Korea signed their Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953, the United 
States of a America had a permanent strategic interest in the Korean peninsula during 
the Cold War, and American troops were present in Korea along the Demilitarized Zone. 
For the year 1961, we assumed that military aid would endure for only ﬁve years 
because diplomatic relations were strained between the United States and Korea 
owing to the military coup of that year. For the years from 1962 through 1968 inclusive, 
we assumed that the duration of military aid was 15 years. This was the period of the 
American troop buildup in Vietnam and Korea sent forces there as an ally of the 
Americans. The Brown Memorandum was issued in 1966, and the United States of 
America–South Korean Status of Forces Agreement came into effect in 1966. 
For the years from 1969 through 1980 inclusive, we assumed that the expected 
duration of military aid ﬂow was 10 years: The Nixon Doctrine was promulgated in 
1969, and there was less emphasis on military assistance. This period saw a call for big 
reductions in defense spending in the United States of America, and there was a plan 
for partial withdrawal of American forces from Korea. Indeed, the reduction plan 
entailed cutting American forces in Korea from 62,000 to 10,000 soldiers. The Carter 
Administration maintained a withdrawal plan in spite of the Pueblo incident. 
From 1981 to the present, the expected duration of military aid is one year. The 
United States of America has called on Korea to increase its share of expenses for 
America forces in Korea, and the Nunn–Warner Resolution has led to a reassessment 
of the role of American forces in Asia and the Paciﬁc region. 
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Notes 
1. There is a subtlety here: the absolute level of a generational account is not meaningful, as 
Kotlikoff recognizes. A generational account, based upon current government policy and as­
sumptions about the future behavior of the economy, can serve only as a benchmark against 
which one measures the effects of alternative government policies. Just as a utility function is 
deﬁned only up to a class of monotonic functions, so are changes in generational accounts 
meaningful only as a measure of changes in policy, since only differences in individual utilities 
can be identiﬁed with different government policies. 
2. Net military transfers have entered the United States of America external accounts on the 
balance of goods and services since 1960. 
3. These preferences are quite general and not restricted to those satisfying the axioms of 
expected utility. 
4. Of course, in our simple economy, there is only one period before the resolution of uncer­
tainty, and thus there is no distinction between this stock and its ﬁrst difference. Fisher (1995) 
actually deﬁnes the aggregate generational current account to be the present value of these ﬁrst 
differences, but most macroeconomic statistics are reported in current dollars and we follow that 
convention here. 
5. See Sakong (1993) and Krueger (1979) for a thorough discussion of these issues. 
6. The important changes were the Nixon Doctrine in 1969 and the Carter Administration’s 
troop withdrawal plan in 1977. 
7. The dollar value of Korean direct foreign investment abroad in country i at the end of year t 
⎛ S F  ⎞i t, i t,is Ki t, = Ki t, −1 ⎟ + Ii t, , where Ki,t is the dollar value of the stock of Korean net foreign⎜ S F⎝ i t, −1 i t, −1 ⎠
assets; Si,t is the stock market index of country i at the end of time t, Fi,t is the dollar price of 
currency i at the end of time t, and Ii,t is the dollar value of the ﬂow of Korean outward foreign 
direct investment in country i during year t. Data on inward foreign direct investment are 
available only from 1962, and those on outward foreign direct investment are reported starting 
only in 1968. We assumed that each Ki,t was zero before the relevant data were reported. 
8. These countries are Korea’s major trading partners in the broad regions reported in the data 
on outward foreign direct investment in the Bank of Korea’s Economic Statistics Yearbook. 
9. Here we use the not implausible assumption that the agents not yet conceived are indifferent 
about the possibility of their eventual birth. 
